Johann Fichte basic ideas of philosophy. The main points of Fichte's philosophy. Leaving the University of Jena, final years
Fichte's philosophy seems to be something special. It is puzzling how such a complex, seemingly incomprehensible subjective-idealistic philosophy could have such a great influence that the leading philosophers of the time, such as, for example, Kant’s propagandist K.-L. Reinhold and especially the representatives of the next generation to which they belonged
F.-V.-I. Schelling and G.-W.-F. Hegel, have you moved away from Kantianism? Already in Hegel's very first treatises, published in 1801 and 1802, we encounter the influence of Fichte. Also, Hegel’s criticism of Kant in the so-called encyclopedic (“Little”) logic has certain features of the influence of Fichte. Fichte influenced Schelling even more, who did not completely abandon him even after he published his “System of Transcendental Idealism,” which was incompatible with Fichte’s position. Hegel had only to explain the difference between these two philosophical systems in the treatise “Difference between the systems of philosophy of Fichte and Schelling” (“Differenz des Fichteschen und Schellingschen Systems”), written in 1801.
The reasons for success have already been discussed. Fichte. The rejection of the unknowable "thing in itself", the emphasis on the moral and cognitive autonomy of man and the dynamic understanding of consciousness were the positive elements with which Fichte marked the further stage of philosophical development.
Johann Gottlieb Fichte was born in 1762 in Ramenau, in the Lusatian region. He was born into a weaver's family and already as a boy had to work at the machine. Chance helped him get an education - his owner noticed him and decided to help. In 1774, Fichte was accepted into the school in Schulpfort. However, since his patron died that same year, Fichte’s studies were accompanied by constant need. Need forced him to leave his studies, for some time he became a home teacher. In 1790, he became acquainted with Kant’s treatises, which revolutionized his life. To meet Kant, he went on foot to Konigsberg, where he presented him with his first major treatise, “An Experience in the Criticism of All Revelation.” (“Kritik aller Offenbarung”) Kant helped the publication of his treatise, and a favorable review, together with Kant’s public confirmation of Fichte’s authorship, helped the young philosopher become famous. At the same time (1793), Fichte anonymously published two treatises in defense of the French revolution. - “Note on the correctness of public judgments about the French Revolution” (“Beitrage zur Berichtigung der Urteile des Publikums fiber die Franzosische Revolution”) - Fichte published
under his own name again, already as a professor in Jena in 1795. In 1794-1795. he publishes his main work - “The Basis of General Scientific Teaching” (“Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre”). Among his other treatises, the “Foundation of Natural Law” (“Grundlage des Natur-rechts”), written in 1797, and the lecture “The Concept of an Educated Man” (“Bestimmung des Gelehr-ten”) (1794) 70 deserve mention. In 1798, Fichte was forced to leave the University of Jena, where he had been a professor since 1794. Fichte’s dismissal was facilitated by the legend of him as a “democrat” and even a “Jacobin,” to which he owed his treatises on the French Revolution. Of the works that Fichte wrote after leaving the university, his “Speeches to the German Nation” (“Reden an die deutsche Nation”) (1807-1808), which contributed to the growth of national consciousness in Germany during the Napoleonic Wars, received the most publicity.
Later, when the University of Berlin was founded in 1810, Fichte became its first rector, but soon abandoned his academic position. This gives him the opportunity to carry out lecture activities more widely. He died in 1814 from typhus, which he contracted from his wife, who voluntarily cared for wounded soldiers.
The starting point of Fichte's philosophy is the thesis of autonomy I- A prominent philosopher from the GDR, M. Boer, points out that Fichte's importance is associated with his support for the French Revolution after the ebb of the revolutionary tide and the sobering of the revolutionary upsurge 71 . He emphasizes that the ideal of the unconditioned I was an ideological expression of resistance to these relations, while mechanistic determinism, which did not distinguish between the natural and social spheres of reality, and subordinated all reality to blind necessity, was understood as support for these relations. In this spirit, Fichte says: “The strict determinist completely denies the independence of the ego, which the idealist places on, and makes it a contingent product,” 72 that is, something derivative.
Along with the general relationship, which goes beyond philosophy, Fichte's principle also has a purely theoretical source. Fichte came to understand that our awareness of the existence of external
the world is conditioned by the awareness of our perceptions as independent of our will and accompanied by a “sense of necessity.” “Where did the system of ideas come from, accompanied by a sense of necessity?” - asks Fichte and answers that their source is not “the thing in itself”, but “the action of the intellect” 73. “Effective” here means the formation of sensory experience “pure” I, which, like Kant’s, is subject to categories. From "pure" I Fichte distinguishes the "empirical" I, which is not aware of this “pure” I. The “pure” is realized I by its results, which we, however, are not aware of. If I with its perceptions depended on the external world, then it would be subordinate to the world (it would be its “accident”), because sensations motivate our desires.
Schelling, who was at first a follower of Fichte, characterizing his position, says that for him I there is everything. As a result, Fichte came to the point that he proclaimed sensations as his own product I, however, an alienated product, which we, in fact, do not recognize as such.
The principle of the theoretically “acting” “pure” I is, according to Fichte, “absolute productivity,” i.e., not conditioned by anything external, the spontaneous formation of sensory content. It is identical with the action of the “power of representation”. At the same time, Fichte emphasizes that in “empirical consciousness” (which is aware of the results of the activity of the “pure” I and considers it something alien) self-awareness is associated with “external” experience. At the top of the entire theory of “learning” is the position: “The Self is posited as determined through the non-Self,” i.e., awareness of something external precedes awareness of oneself 75 . In specific analyses, Fichte points to the priority of external experience, but, of course, after a theoretical explanation of it as a product of the unconscious activity of the I.
The above ideas put Fichte on a par with the subjective idealists. From a historical point of view, Fichte conveys new impulses to German classical philosophy. Politically he was a progressive person. We must also not forget that his subjective idealism differs from Berkeley’s idealism in its emphasis on activity I
(at Berkeley I remains passive) and that which is “pure” I has a general, supra-individual character rather than identity with our personal I- This indicates that Fichte occupies a transitional position towards objective idealism.
In creative imagery, which is absolute and therefore can limit itself (this self-limitation is manifested by a certain repetition of its works), Fichte seeks the precondition of empirical consciousness. The repetition of sensory content, as well as its categorical design, forms, however, only abstract prerequisites for “experience”, to which self-awareness and conviction in the objective nature of the perceived world belong.
Fichte proclaims that an explanation of “real life.”, “empirical life” of consciousness “in time” 76 is possible, but only on the basis of practical relations I to the world. Therefore, the previous version of the “theoretical science” must be supplemented by a presentation of the “practical science”, which defends the thesis that towards awareness. objective nature of reality, the subject comes through biological and labor relations to the world (here we see a big shift in the understanding of practical relations compared to Kant). It turns out that Fichte understands the insufficiency of contemplative consciousness and paves the way for its explanation on the basis of a “practical” attitude towards the world. Overcoming the contemplative, noetic orientation and emphasizing the importance of the “practical” relationship to reality form the prerequisites for a philosophical revolution, which Fichte himself did not sufficiently understand. So, it is true that Fichte was aware that the “being for us” of objects means more than presence, than content in consciousness, that it contains the practical urgency of objects in relation to the biological organism and their “resistance” (Widerstand) to drive until now not conscious I, which would master them.
The plane in which real self-consciousness and consciousness of the external world arises could be called “biological experience.” This is a subjective expression of agreement or disagreement, a contradiction between the environment and the ego’s desire to appropriate it. In the "instinctive" self
(i.e. in a living being) there is a “sensation of power”, which Fichte calls the “principle of life of consciousness” and the “transition from death to life” of consciousness 77 . The environment, however, provides “resistance” 78 or “counter-urge” in such a way that instinctively I feels strength, but also experiences a feeling of “powerlessness” and “pressure” 79 . Only here do “objects” arise from the non-I, that is, from the sensory reality of the environment, that is, only here does the “instinctive” begin I realize your environment as objects (according to Fichte, the German Gegenstand - object is identical in meaning to the word Wider-stand - resistance). To understand this thesis of Fichte, we recall that in Hegel’s “Phenomenology of Spirit” the “slave” with difficulty acquires the experience of the “independence of his object” 80, that is, he realizes its independence from himself and the fact that the object is not subject to his arbitrariness .
A subjective expression of the contradiction between the tendency to expand one’s own power (which is inherent in I) and between its limitation, caused by the resistance of external objects, is the “desire” to overcome the limitation 81, which puts pressure on I from the outside, and make external reality itself. Of course, this tendency is restrained by the “resistance” of external objects, which causes I feeling of limitation and fear.
In striving and in activity (into which striving turns) the unconscious, instinctive I begins to realize the difference “inside” and “outside” of one’s own gravity and the resistance of the environment, which resists and therefore becomes an “object” (or “objects”). The motif of “biological experience” is emphasized in the “Moral Teaching” (“Sittenlehre”, 1797), where Fichte no longer proceeds from an abstract tendency to master everything that is alien to the body, but speaks of “instinct,” “need” and “satisfaction.” “Instinct flows exclusively from my nature. It determines in advance what should be here for me.” , and my impulse and desire" covers it from what is here for me and would influence me... I don’t starve because there is food for me here, but I starve because something becomes food for me" 82 . “To be for me” means the same thing as having a biological meaning, to be isolated from the indifferent and neutral
reality based on biological significance for my body.
Self-awareness, which arises from the biological-CKoroNonbiTa, is achieved by “reflecting” the impulse due to the fact that the impulse is recognized as mine. Thanks to awareness, impulse ceases to be blind and nature is deprived of its exclusive rights to my I, which until now was only a passive mirror of instinctive behavior. “Nature does not act, only a free being acts,” 83 says Fichte. Overcoming the instinctive way of life, which Fichte explains as awareness of the instinct of impulse, represents a “leap” from natural necessity into the human world.
If the satisfaction of an animal's drive occurs with necessity, then a person acts according to a conscious intention. “A person is not simply driven by a natural impulse; in short, it is not in my power that I feel or not feel a certain impulse. It is in my power, however, whether I satisfy him or not” 84.
Being conscious, the impulse ceases to be blind and falls under the authority of self-consciousness. Even if I act in some way, at the beginning of my action there is a free decision, even if it consists of nothing other than the approval of a sensual desire. This should not change anything in the content of behavior: for example, if an animal acts for the sake of profit, a person can act for the sake of profit, but, however, he acts freely, because he acts consciously and according to the authority of his will. However, this freedom, which is achieved with consciousness, is freedom only in a formal sense. While a person strives only for the living, he depends on a given sensory object - the object of desire. Behavior occurs with the knowledge of his will, but the consequence of behavior is confirmation of man’s lack of independence and dependence on nature, his attachment to natural objects.
From this, Fichte concludes that the moral task of humanity is the transformation of nature and society. Man must make nature and society identical with himself, with his inner nature of a self-conscious being who is capable of transcending
fly the conditions of your motives, instincts. By his internal character, a person is “his own goal, must determine himself and not allow himself to be determined by anything external” 85.
Since we are talking about the relationship to nature, the moral task of man, according to Fichte, is to destroy the original natural certainty of objects and adapt to them so that in them it becomes clearly visible that they represent his mirror image, that he leaves his “mark” on them » 86. Only in this way can he avoid death - the fate of every mortal being. From Fichte’s text radiates the pathos of an action that transcends the boundaries of the human individual and continues in subsequent generations: “Everything that has ever been great, wise and noble among people is these noble human generations, whose names are revered in world history, and those numerous men , whose merits are only known, but not their names - they all worked for me... I can continue from where they should have stopped, I can continue to build this sublime temple, which they should have left unfinished. Someone might say to me: “You will, however, have to stop, just like them.” This is the most sublime idea of all. If I take over their sublime task, I will never finish it, but I can also... never stop acting, never stop being. What we call death should not interrupt my work, for it must be completed, but cannot be completed at a certain time, thereby my existence is not determined in time, but I am eternal. By taking on this great task, I gained eternity. I boldly raise my head to the menacing rocky mountains, to the mad flow of water, to the stormy clouds; floating in a sea of fire, and shouting: “I am eternal and resist your power. Let everything fall on me, and you, the earth, and you, the sky, will mix in crazy chaos, you, the elements, will sing with rage and tear apart in a fierce battle the last speck of dust of the body that I call mine - my will, at one with my definite plan, it will be boldly and coolly to rise above the ruins of the vale of the world, for I understood my calling, and this is more durable than you. It
eternal, and I am also eternal."
If we are talking about attitudes towards society, Fichte's solution takes the form of a philosophy of history, which proceeds from the idea that history should concretely realize the same equality that belongs to people regarding the fact that each person is “an end in himself” 88 . The real embodiment of equality will come through the “urge to identity.” People who are equal in the abstract, in the sense of their self-end value, must realize this abstract equality in their meaningful being, in which there are differences between them in strength, abilities, position, talent, etc. .
The tendency towards mutual influence or “social impulse” (the impulse towards identity in relation to others) “strives not towards subordination, as it happens in the bodily world, but ... towards coordination” 89 (i.e. towards concrete equality, reciprocity) . This is the purpose of history. Fichte was not satisfied with just the general concept - he draws a conclusion from this in the sense of utopian socialism. In the treatise where he develops the concept of society more specifically, in “The Closed Trading State” (“Der geschlossene Handelsstaat”), written in 1800, Fichte demands that society guarantee not only the formal equality of individuals, but also their the “right” to “certain free activity” in certain branches of the social division of labor 90.
The basis of society is the division of labor, realized without private ownership of the means of production. Fichte is a theorist of ownership without private property, that is, property consists of the individual’s right to have the means necessary to perform work in the chosen industry 91. The division of labor is due to the fact that “no one can work for another without also working for himself...” 92 . Mutual giving and acceptance are a source of constant improvement, ennobling humanity to realize the individual’s identification with other individuals.
Let us now return to the question of how Fichte* could have such a great influence, despite the speculative nature of his philosophy. Firstly, Fichte overcame Kant's dualism of the “thing in itself” and appearance, which was brought forward by Kant in the “Critique of Ability”
judgments" to the limit. Fichte with his speculative solution, according to which nature is an alienated product I, connects knowledge and nature, man and the world. As can be seen, he offers a subjective idealistic solution, in reality, however, in the theory of “pure” I- it develops into objective idealism.
Secondly, Fichte understands consciousness as a dynamic formation in which feelings, perception and image-creation are understood as the lowest stage of realization of the basic tendency towards self-reflection or self-awareness. From this point of view, it does not matter whether feelings and perceptions are understood as dependent on external reality, but what does matter is that I in its development towards self-reflection cannot stop at them, that it must overcome them in self-awareness. At the same time, it must be emphasized that Fichte understands the development of consciousness in tireless interaction with the non-I, that is, with the sphere of external experience.
Finally, Fichte influenced the development of the philosophy of the “active side,” that is, the development of reflection on practical relations I with external reality. Overcoming the boundaries of purely theoretical knowledge, which in Kant is limited to the reflection of moral behavior, in Fichte is extended to the reflection of instinct and labor, which is important for recognizing the noetic significance of human practice.
An important step in the revision of Kant’s teaching was taken by Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814), pointing out the inconsistency of the concept of “things in themselves” and the need to eliminate it from critical philosophy as a relic of dogmatic thinking. According to Fichte, not only the form of knowledge, but also its entire content must be derived from the “pure I” of transcendental apperception. And this means that the Kantian transcendental subject thereby turns into the absolute beginning of all things - the “absolute I”, from whose activity the entire fullness of reality, the entire objective world, called by Fichte “not-I”, should be explained. Thus understood, the subject essentially takes the place of the divine substance of classical rationalism (it is known that in his youth Fichte was interested in the philosophy of Spinoza).
To understand Fichte’s concept, it should be borne in mind that he proceeds from Kant’s transcendentalism, that is, he discusses the problem of knowledge, not being. The main question of Kant’s “Critique of Pure Reason”: “how synthetic a priori judgments are possible,” that is, how scientific knowledge is possible, remains central in Fichte. Therefore, Fichte calls his philosophy “the doctrine of science” (scientific doctrine). Science, according to Fichte, differs from non-scientific ideas due to its systematic form. However, systematicity is, although a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for the scientific nature of knowledge: the truth of the entire system is based on the truth of its original principles. This last, says Fichte, must be immediately certain, that is, obvious.
Just as Descartes, in search of the most reliable principle, turned to our ego, so does Fichte. The most reliable thing in our minds, he says, is self-awareness: “I am”, “I am I”. The act of self-awareness is a unique phenomenon; according to Fichte, he is an action and at the same time a product of this action, that is, the coincidence of opposites - subject and object, for in this act the I generates itself, posits itself.
However, despite all the similarities between Fichte’s original principle and the Cartesian one, there is also a significant difference between them. The action by which the I gives birth to itself is, according to Fichte, an act of freedom. Therefore, the judgment “I am” is not simply a statement of some existing fact, such as, for example, the judgment “The rose is red.” In reality, this is like a response to a call, to a demand - “Be!”, be aware of your Self, create it as a kind of autonomous reality by an act of awareness-generation, and thereby enter the world of free, and not just natural, beings. This requirement appeals to the will, and therefore the judgment “I am I” expresses the same autonomy of the will that Kant laid as the basis of ethics. The philosophy of Kant and Fichte is the idealism of freedom, an ethically oriented idealism.
However, Fichte does not have the dividing line that Kant drew between the world of nature, where necessity reigns, lawfulness, studied by science, and the world of freedom, the basis of which is expediency. In Fichte's absolute self, the theoretical and practical principles coincide and nature turns out to be only a means for the realization of human freedom, losing the remainder of the independence that it had in Kant's philosophy. Activity, the activity of the absolute subject becomes for Fichte the only source of everything that exists. We accept the existence of natural objects as something independent only because the activity with the help of which these objects are generated is hidden from our consciousness: to reveal the subjective-active principle in all objectively existing things - such is the task of Fichte’s philosophy. Nature, according to Fichte, does not exist in itself, but for the sake of something else: in order to realize itself, the activity of the I needs some obstacle, overcoming which it unfolds all its definitions and, finally, fully realizes itself, thereby achieving identity with itself. myself. Such an identity, however, cannot be achieved in a finite time; it is an ideal to which the human race strives, never fully achieving it. The movement towards such an ideal constitutes the meaning of the historical process.
In his teaching, Fichte, as we see, in an idealistic form expressed the conviction that a practical-active attitude towards an object lies at the basis of a theoretical-contemplative attitude towards it. Fichte argued that human consciousness is active not only when it thinks, but also in the process of perception, when, as the French materialists (and partly also Kant) believed, it is influenced by something outside of itself. The German philosopher believed that to explain the process of sensation and perception one should not refer to the action of “things in themselves,” but it is necessary to identify those acts of self-activity of the Self (lying beyond the borders of consciousness) that form the invisible basis of “passive” contemplation of the world.
Although the German idealists, including Fichte, did not go as far in practical political issues as the ideologists of the French Revolution, in terms of philosophy proper they turned out to be more revolutionary than the French enlighteners.
Already in Kant, the concept of a transcendental subject does not coincide with either the individual human subject or the divine mind of traditional rationalism. No less complex is the original concept of Fichte’s teachings - the concept of “I”. On the one hand, Fichte means the Self, which each person discovers in the act of self-reflection, and therefore the individual, or empirical Self. On the other hand, this is a certain absolute reality, never completely accessible to our consciousness, from which, through its self-development and self-discovery, is generated the entire universe and which therefore is the divine, absolute Self. The Absolute Self is an endless activity that becomes the property of individual consciousness only at the moment when it encounters some obstacle and is limited by this latter. But at the same time, having encountered a boundary, a certain non-I, activity rushes beyond the boundaries of this boundary, then again encounters a new obstacle, etc. This pulsation of activity and its awareness (stopping) constitutes the very nature of the Self, which, thus, is not infinite and not finite, but is the unity of the opposites of the finite and infinite, human and divine, individual Self and absolute Self. This is the original contradiction of the Self. , the unfolding of which, according to Fichte, constitutes the content of the entire world process and, accordingly, the teaching of science reflecting this process. The individual I and the absolute I in Fichte sometimes coincide and are identified, sometimes they fall apart and differ; this “pulsation” of coincidence-disintegration is the core of Fichte’s dialectic, the driving principle of his system. Along with self-consciousness (“I am”), its opposite is also posited - non-I. The coexistence of these opposites in one Self is possible, according to Fichte, only by limiting each other, that is, by partial mutual destruction. But the partial mutual destruction of opposites means that the Self and the non-Self are divisible, for only the divisible consists of parts. The entire dialectical process aims to reach a point at which the contradiction is resolved and the opposites - the individual Self and the absolute Self - coincide. However, the complete achievement of this ideal is impossible: all human history is only an endless approximation to it. It was this point of Fichte's teaching - the unattainability of the identity of opposites - that became the subject of criticism by his younger contemporaries - Schelling and Hegel. This criticism was carried out by both from the standpoint of objective idealism, which, however, they justified differently.
Fichte Johann Gottlieb(1762-1814), German philosopher, representative of German classical philosophy.
Fichte's own philosophy began with the development of the philosophical ideas of Immanuel Kant. But in his work, Fichte tried to overcome Kant’s dualism, which separated by an impassable abyss the objectively existing world, concrete things (noumenon, matter) and ideas that reflect this world (phenomenon, the subjective world of man). Fichte strengthened the idealistic side of Kant's philosophical views in the direction of monism and objective idealism. Fichte discarded existence (being) and focused exclusively on the only undoubted “I” thinking. Along with Descartes’ “existence,” Fichte also rejected the Kantian “thing in itself.” “I” in Fichte is that which manifests itself in all acts of human thinking, feeling and will; “I” cannot cause anyone to doubt its existence. It, the “I” is not only the basis and the only point of the human vision of the world, the “I” is the only essence of the world itself. Starting from this “I”, Fichte undertakes to create a system of scientific, absolutely reliable and absolutely true philosophy.
First position his Fichte's teachings formulated this way: “I believe to myself.” “I” does not depend on anything, is not conditioned by anything. It creates (posits) itself. It is! Fichte tries to convince the reader that only a philosophically immature individual could fail to realize this position.
Second position his Fichte's teachings formulated this way: “I posits non-I.” The second position, as we see, is a continuation and antithesis of the first position and says that the world external to a person is the creation of his spirit, his own “I”. The essence of knowledge lies, according to Fichte, in the knowledge of the relationship between the “I” and the “not-I”, in the process of which genuine knowledge is achieved not only of the seemingly external world, but also of the “I” itself (myself).
Third position his Fichte's teachings formulated this way: “I posits the non-I and myself.” This position is a synthesis of the previous two provisions - the thesis (“I posits itself”) and the antithesis (“I posits the non-I”) as a result of which, according to Fichte, a transition is made to the understanding of the absolute subject, the absolute I, as something completely unconditional and nothing not determined by the highest.
Unlike Kant, who depicted the established aspects of consciousness, Fichte includes development in his philosophy, speaks of contradiction as the source of this development, in other words, develops philosophical dialectics.
Fichte called his system of philosophy Science. This is how he called his main work, which he supplemented and improved all his life; To develop the ideas contained in it, the work “Science”, he additionally wrote a number of books and articles, some of which were published after the death of the philosopher.
In Western European philosophy of the 17th-18th centuries, the topic of epistemology (the question of human knowledge) came to one of the most important places. The head of the empirical school, John Locke, believed that the spirit of a person at birth is a blank slate (tabula rasa). There are no “innate ideas”, and the only source of our knowledge is experience. The data of experience leave “imprints” in us, from which entirely a picture of the world is emerging.
In the second half of the 18th century, Locke's views were criticized by the famous German philosopher Immanuel Kant. According to Kant's philosophy, the main forms of human perception are intuition space and time, as well as 12 primary categories reason (concepts of reality, cause, effect, possibility, etc.) - cannot be obtained from experience and exist in our spirit as innate, preceding any practice a priori given. This a priori content conditions experience, determining the fundamental ways in which the external world (“things-in-themselves”) appears to our knowledge. We do not know what things in themselves really are, because in the process of experience we deal not with them directly, but with their images, presented in the above-mentioned a priori forms of our epistemological ability. " Criticism» Kant gained great popularity as a strong objection to Locke and the empiricists.
Immanuel Kant
Fichte's epistemology and criticism of Kant's ideas in it
An attempt to develop Kant's ideas was made by his younger contemporary, the German philosopher Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814). A strong-willed man, very prone to mental independence, Fichte expressed these properties of his character in the philosophical system he created.
Fichte believed that Kant did not fully develop the following aspects of his philosophical teaching:
1) Having declared that the true essence of “things in themselves” is unknowable, Kant still did not dare to eliminate this world external to man entirely and, without strict evidence, insisted on its reality. Fichte believed that the very idea of things in themselves should be recognized as the fruit of the mental activity of the human ego.
2) The structure of a priori forms of understanding in Kant is quite complex. He himself outlined (in the form of so-called schemes) the connection between space-time intuitions and the 12 basic logical categories. But, according to Fichte, this part of metaphysics was not sufficiently developed by Kant, because he never indicated a single principle of knowledge, from which both intuitions and categories would follow with immutable necessity.
Already from the posing of these questions it is clear that Kant’s criticism should have received an even more pronounced subjectivist bias in Fichte’s philosophy. Fichte considered his theory of “subjective idealism” a direct continuation of Kant’s “critical idealism,” although Kant himself disapproved of it.
Johann Gottlieb Fichte
Fichte developed the main provisions of his epistemology in a series of works under the general title “Science”. At the center of everything, he, like Descartes, recognizes the irrefutable fact of self-consciousness. According to Fichte, already in this primary feeling of our own “I” all Kantian categories are contained. “I am” means: “I am I,” “I am identical with my own Self.” This is where the category of identity arises. I am real, and this cannot be doubted - therefore, the fact of self-consciousness also contains the Kantian category of reality. Our self-consciousness necessarily presupposes the concept of the external, of an object that opposes the thinking subject. From here we get the categories of contradiction, negation (“I am not the Not-I”), limitation and interaction. Since I and Not-I (subject and object) cannot exist without each other, they must be considered as two inseparable parts of one common essence. This is where the categories of substance – belonging – come from. In a similar way, Fichte derives all other Kantian categories from self-consciousness.
The act of self-consciousness breaks down into three inevitable moments: 1) self-awareness of the Self, 2) the idea of the Not-Self, 3) the awareness that without the Not-Self there is no Self. The concept of these three moments of the manifestation of the spirit introduced in Fichte’s philosophy is - thesis, antithesis and synthesis- was then widely developed in the systems of Schelling and Hegel.
Fichte, in contrast to Kant, does not treat the intuitions of space and time as something a priori given to a person, but as a creation of our very “I”. Fichte generally represents consciousness active, while Kant is more inclined to consider it passive-contemplative. This is the root of the difference between their systems, this is where all their main differences stem.. The activity of the mind, according to Fichte's philosophy, consists of a constant transfer of attention from one object to another: conscious acts separate, are consistent and are directed alternately to different objects. In order for these acts to be such, our “I” and creates intuitions of spatial extent and temporal sequence, rather than placing things in " already existing» space and time. Space and time are products of the creative activity of the mind. Fichte proves this by saying that there is no “empty space” and “empty time”. They are conceivable only in specific conscious acts associated with things and processes. Therefore, these two fundamental intuitions are being created by these acts themselves, but not determine their.
The freedom of the human self is clearly expressed in activity voluntary attention. We, writes Fichte, have “absolute freedom... to direct attention to a known object or to divert it from another object.” But, despite the constant desire to make the human I completely independent of everything external, Fichte still has to admit that he himself the primary act of consciousness by which I and Not-I, subject and object are created, does not depend onfree will individual. The occurrence of this act cannot be explained without the hypothesis of the presence, along with our personal Self, of another - absolute, supra-individual self. It, like God, gives the initial impetus to the activity of the mind, which, having received it, then proceeds freely.
The highest goal of the activity of the I, according to Fichte’s philosophy, is to spiritualize, intellectualize the Non-I that opposes it, raise it to the highest level of consciousness, and subordinate it to the law of reason, identical to the law of conscience. But the realization of my freedom is possible only on the condition that I am surrounded not only by soulless things, but also by other free beings similar to me. Only they will be able to show an arbitrary, not predictable in advance, not governed by any laws reaction to my actions. The superindividual Self creates a mass of such beings that interact and encourage each other to collectively overcome the inert opposition of the Not-Self.
Fichte is a famous German philosopher, today considered a classic. His basic idea was that a person shapes himself in the process of activity. The philosopher influenced the work of many other thinkers who developed his ideas.
Biography
Fichte Johann Gottlieb is a philosopher, an outstanding representative of the direction of German classical philosophy, who was also involved in social activities. The Thinker was born on May 19. 1762 in the village of Rammenau in a large family engaged in peasant labor. With the assistance of a wealthy relative, after graduating from a city school, the boy was accepted to study at an elite educational institution intended for nobles - Pfortu. Johann Fichte then studied at the Universities of Jena and Leizipg. Since 1788, the philosopher has worked as a home teacher in Zurich. At the same time, the thinker met his future wife, Johanna Rahn.
Introduction to Kant's ideas
In the summer of 1791, the philosopher attended lectures by Immanuel Kant, then held in Königsberg. Acquaintance with the concepts of the great thinker predetermined the entire further course of I. G. Fichte’s philosophical work. Kant responded positively to his work entitled “An Essay on the Critique of All Revelation.” This essay, the authorship of which was initially erroneously attributed to Kant, revealed to the scientist the possibility of obtaining professorship at the University of Jena. He began working there in 1794.
The biography of Johann Fichte continues with the fact that in 1795 the thinker began to publish his own journal, called the “Philosophical Journal of the Society of German Scientists.” It was during that period that his main works were written:
“Fundamentals of General Science” (1794);
“Fundamentals of natural law according to the principles of scientific teaching” (1796);
“The First Introduction to the Study of Science” (1797);
“Second Introduction to the Study of Science for Readers Already Having a Philosophical System” (1797);
“A system of teaching about morality according to the principles of scientific teaching” (1798).
These works influenced the philosophers of Fichte's contemporaries - Schelling, Goethe, Schiller, Novalis.
Leaving the University of Jena, final years
In 1799, the philosopher was accused of atheism, which was prompted by the publication of one of his articles. In it, Fichte said that God is not a person, but represents a moral world order. The philosopher had to leave the walls of the University of Jena.
Since 1800, Fichte has lived and worked in Berlin. In 1806, after defeat in the war with Napoleon, the Prussian government was forced to move to Königsberg. Fichte followed his compatriots and began teaching at the local university until 1807. After some time, he moved to Berlin again, and in 1810 he became rector of the University of Berlin.
His lectures, which were given after the defeat of the Prussian troops at Jena, called on German townspeople to resist the French occupiers. These speeches made Fichte one of the main intellectuals of the then resistance to Napoleon's regime.
The philosopher's last days were spent in Berlin. He died on January 29, 1814 due to typhoid infection from his own wife, who was then caring for the wounded in the hospital.
Fichte's attitude towards Kant
The scientist believed that Kant in his works shows the truth without demonstrating its foundations. Therefore, Fichte himself must create a philosophy like geometry, the basis of which will be the consciousness of the “I”. He called such a system of knowledge “scientific teaching.” The philosopher points out that this is the ordinary consciousness of a person, acting as detached from the individual himself and elevated to the Absolute. The entire world around us is a creation of the “I”. It is effective, active. The development of self-awareness occurs through the struggle between consciousness and the surrounding world.
Fichte believed that Kant did not fully develop several aspects of his teaching. First, by declaring that the true meaning of each “thing in itself” is unknowable, Kant was unable to eliminate the external world given to the individual and, without any rigorous evidence, insisted that it was real. Fichte believed that the very concept of a “thing in itself” should be recognized as the result of the mental work of the “I” itself.
Secondly, the scientist considered the structure of a priori forms of consciousness in Kant to be quite complex. But at the same time, Fichte believed that this part of metaphysics was not sufficiently developed by his colleague, because in his works he did not derive a single principle of knowledge, from which various categories and intuitions would follow.
Other famous works of Fichte
Among the famous works of the scientist, the following works should be highlighted:
“On the appointment of a scientist” (1794);
“On the Purpose of Man” (1800);
“A message as clear as the sun to the general public about the true essence of modern philosophy. An attempt to force readers to understand" (1801);
"The Main Features of the Modern Age" (1806).
The main ideas of Johann Fichte were presented in a series of works published under the general title “Science”. The philosopher, like Descartes, recognizes the fact of self-consciousness as the center of all things. According to Fichte, this sensation already contains all the categories that Kant derived in his works. For example, “I am” is equivalent to the expression “I am I.” Another philosophical category, identity, follows from this concept.
The idea of freedom
In the philosophical works of Johann Fichte, two main periods are distinguished: the stage of the concept of activity and the stage of the concept of the Absolute. By the activity of consciousness, the philosopher primarily understood the moral behavior of a person. Finding freedom and achieving activity that can overcome any obstacles is the moral duty of every person.
The philosopher comes to the most important conclusion that a person can come to the realization of freedom only in certain historical conditions, at a certain stage of development of society. But at the same time, Johann Fichte believed that freedom itself is inseparable from knowledge. It can be acquired only with a high level of development of the spiritual culture of the individual. Thus, culture, together with morality, makes all the work of an individual possible.
Practical activity in the works of the thinker
One of the most valuable ideas of Fichte's philosophy is the consideration of activity through the prism of removing intermediate goals using all kinds of means. In the process of human life, practical contradictions are inevitable and arise almost constantly. That is why the process of activity represents an endless overcoming of these conflicts and incompatibilities. The philosopher understands activity itself as the work of practical reason, but at the same time the question of activity forces philosophers to think about their nature.
One of the most important achievements of Fichte's philosophy is the development of the dialectical method of thinking. He says that everything that exists is contradictory, but at the same time the opposites are in their unity. Contradiction, the philosopher believes, is one of the most important sources of development. Fichte considers categories not simply as a collection of a priori forms of consciousness, but as a system of concepts. These systems absorb the knowledge that a person acquires in the course of his “I” activity.
A question of freedom
Personal freedom, according to Fichte, is expressed in the work of voluntary attention. A person, the philosopher writes, has absolute freedom to direct the focus of his attention to the desired object or to distract it from another object. However, despite the desire to make the personality independent of the external world, Fichte still recognizes that the very primary activity of consciousness, through which it is separated from the external world (the “I” and “Not-I” are separated), does not depend on the free will of an individual person.
The highest goal of the activity of the “I,” according to Fichte, is to spiritualize the opposing “Not-I” and raise it to a higher level of consciousness. At the same time, the realization of freedom becomes possible provided that the “I” is surrounded not by soulless objects, but by other free beings similar to it. Only they can show an arbitrary, and not predictable, reaction to the actions of the “I”. Society is a mass of such beings, constantly interacting with each other and encouraging them to collectively overcome such external influences of the “Not-Self”.
Philosopher's subjectivism
Johann Fichte's subjectivism can be briefly defined by his famous phrase:
The whole world is Me.
Of course, this expression of the philosopher should not be taken literally. For example, the main thought of another philosopher, David Hume, was the idea that the entire world around us is a collection of sensations experienced by a person. This position is not interpreted literally, but is understood in the sense that the entire surrounding reality is given to people through their sensations, and no one knows what it really is.
Ontology problem
The philosopher was also interested in the question of what ontology is. The definition of this concept is as follows: ontology is a system of knowledge of a metaphysical nature that reveals the features of the category of philosophical understanding of being. Fichte introduces a new concept into science - the ontology of the subject. This existence is a dialectical process of cultural and historical activity of all human civilization. In the process of revealing its essence, the “absolute I” contributes to the limitation of a certain empirical individual, and through him knows himself.
The activity of the “I” is revealed in rational intuition. It is precisely this that represents the guiding thread that helps to move from the status of an empirical subject through practical activity to an absolute subject. Thus, Fichte considers the question of what ontology is in the context of the historical and cultural activity of the individual and the transformations that occur to him in the process of this activity.
